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Abstract
Major revolts have recently erupted in parts of the Middle East with substantial inter-
national repercussions. Predicting, coping with and winning those revolts have become
a grave problem for many regimes and for world powers. We propose a new model
of such revolts that describes their evolution by building on the classic Lanchester
theory of combat. The model accounts for the split in the population between those
loyal to the regime and those favoring the rebels. We show that, contrary to classical
Lanchesterian insights regarding traditional force-on-force engagements, the outcome
of a revolt is independent of the initial force sizes; it only depends on the fraction
of the population supporting each side and their combat effectiveness. The model’s
predictions are consistent with the situations currently observed in Afghanistan, Libya
and Syria (September 2011) and it points to how those situations might evolve.
Keywords: Conflict analysis; Defence studies; System dynamics; Population; Be-
haviour;
Introduction
Recent (2011) events in Libya underscore the significant impact of armed revolts
on regional and global interests. Armed revolts typically start with demon-
strations and civic unrest that quickly turn into local violence and then full-
scale combat. (The terms revolt, rebellion, and insurgency are interchangeable
in most senses and we use the term revolt throughout for consistency.) As
demonstrated in Libya the evolution of the armed revolt has a strong spatial
component; individuals in some regions (e.g., parts of Tripoli) may be loyal
to the regime because of ideology or economic and social incentives or fear,
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while other regions (e.g., Benghazi) become bastions of the rebels powered by
strong local popular support. Thus, armed revolts, very much like conventional
war, are about gaining and controlling populated territory. However, unlike
conventional force-on-force engagements, where the civilian population plays a
background role, armed revolts are characterized by the active role of the people,
who become a major factor in determining the outcome of the conflict: both
the rebels and the regime need the support of the population to carry out their
campaigns (Hammes, 2006; Lynn, 2005).
Armed revolts differ from civil uprisings, such as those that occurred re-
cently (2011) in Tunisia and Egypt, because uprisings are manifested in demon-
strations, which may involve some minor local violence, rather than protracted
armed engagements. Armed revolts often originate from civil uprisings and thus
our model may provide insight into the situation if the uprising is on the verge
of evolving into the more violent revolt. An example of this possible progres-
sion can be found in Syria (September 2011) where an armed revolt seems to be
emerging from a popular uprising mostly due to defections from the government
forces and some foreign supply of arms to local organizations.
Our approach to modeling armed revolts is based on Lanchester theory (Lanchester,
1916) that describes the strength of two opposing military forces by two ordinary
differential equations (ODEs). The forces cause mutual attrition that depletes
their strengths until one of the forces is defeated. While Lanchester models are
stylized and highly abstract, they have been extensively used for analysis for al-
most a century because they provide profound insights regarding conditions that
affect the outcomes of military conflicts. Examples of such analysis using Lanch-
ester models include studies of the Battle of Britain (Johnson and MacKay,
2011), the Battle of Kursk (Lucas and Turkes, 2004), the Ardennes Campaign
(Hung et al., 2005), the Battle of Iwo Jima (Engel, 1954), and the Battle of
Inchon (Hartley and Helmbold, 1995). For further information on the analy-
sis and applications of Lanchester models please refer to Washburn and Kress
(2009).
In the 1960s Deitchman (1962) and Schaffer (1968) proposed variants of the
classic Lanchester equations that more accurately model guerrilla and insur-
gent warfare. The key observation is that attrition of the guerrillas depends
not just on the government forces, but also on the size of the guerrilla force.
The smaller the guerrilla army, the more difficult it is for government forces
to target them. Later works examined more directly the role of the popula-
tion in insurgency conflicts. Intriligator and Brito (1988) explicitly modeled
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the level of popular support for the insurgents with an additional state variable.
McCormick and Giordano (2002) considered only two state variables but intro-
duced terms that allow the government and insurgents to increase in strength
based on popular support. Kress and Szechtman (2009) analyzed the impact of
the population by focusing on how collateral damage and intelligence alter the
dynamics. Blank et al. (2008) used Lanchester techniques to study Operation
Iraqi Freedom.
Here we also examine a conflict between two forces where the population
plays an important role. However, unlike the traditional Lanchester models
used by the previously cited works, our focus is not on attrition but on the con-
trol of friendly and hostile territories. Using our model, we derive the end-state
of the revolt, identify stalemate situations and study the effects of foreign inter-
vention and of inconstant support by the population. We show that contrary
to classical Lanchesterian insights regarding traditional force-on-force engage-
ments, the outcome of a revolt is independent of the initial force sizes. We also
derive conditions for successful foreign interventions.
The main contribution of our model is methodological – extending the clas-
sical Lanchester theory to armed revolts where the population is a key player.
While we dare to make some predictions (about Syria), this is not the main
objective of our work. Similarly to classical Lanchester models, our model is
not predictive; it is descriptive and, at best, diagnostic. Its purpose is to gain
insights about cause-and-effect relations. The main reason for this restrictive
objective is the lack of relevant and reliable data. Having said that, using the
little data available we note that the results of the model are consistent with
the situations currently (September 2011) observed in Afghanistan, Libya and
Syria. We also evaluate policy options facing the international community.
Setting and Assumptions
Consider an armed revolt involving two forces, termed Red and Blue, that rely
on the population for manpower, intelligence, and most other resources. In most
situations one of these forces will be in the position of power (e.g., the govern-
ment forces) and may hold an advantage. We assume a polarized situation
where there are no neutrals in the population, which is divided into supporters
of Blue, called henceforth supporters, and supporters of Red, called henceforth
contrarians. We initially assume that the support strongly depends on factors
such as tribal affiliation, social class, and ideology and therefore remains un-
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changed during the armed revolt. However, later on we relax this assumption
and allow for changes in popular behavior, reflecting pragmatic and opportunis-
tic responses of the population to changes in the force balance.
We assume that the country is divided between Red and Blue and therefore
a populated region lost by one force is gained by the other force. Independent or
neutral regions are not considered because individuals in these areas will often
become entangled in the conflict, even if they initially do not want to, and will
eventually support one of the sides. We also assume that the population in each
region is homogeneous – either supporters or contrarians. This assumption
is reasonable if the resolution of the regions is high enough, and is valid in
particular in tribal societies where members of a clan closely follow their leader.
A force that fights over a region might be either supported or opposed by the
local population, situations which we call liberation or subjugation, respectively.
A liberating force fights more effectively than a subjugating force because of
population support, ceteris paribus. Moreover, the forces in control of hostile
regions are busy policing the population and therefore adopt a defensive pos-
ture. Thus, only the forces operating in friendly regions proactively attempt to
capture additional territories.
Model
Let S and C (S + C = 1) denote the fraction of the total population who are
supporters of Blue and supporters of Red (“contrarians”), respectively. Let
also B and R (B + R = 1) denote the fraction of the population controlled
by Blue and Red, respectively. We use the notation XY for the fraction of
population X that is controlled by force Y , where X = S,C and Y = B,R.
Hence, SB + SR = S and CB + CR = C. The offensive strengths of the Blue
and Red combatants are proportional to SB and CR, respectively. When Blue
subjugates a CR region it becomes part of CB and when Blue liberates an SR
area it becomes part of SB. Similar actions are possible by Red, giving a total of
four kinds of combat engagements, as shown in Figure 1. We implicitly assume
that the country can be divided into areas or regions of sufficiently small size
so that each one can be viewed as a homogeneous group of people belonging to
one of the four types.
Because Red and Blue operate in populated areas, the outcome of an en-
gagement depends both on the strength of the attacking force but also on the
signature (i.e. visibility) of the defending force; smaller attack force (“fewer
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shooters”) or smaller signature (“fewer targets”) result in a smaller gain/loss
rate. Namely, at each interaction, the gain rate of the attacker is given by a scal-
ing constant, called henceforth attrition rate, multiplied by the product of the
attacking and defending force sizes. This relationship implies that even a large
attacker would struggle to find and suppress a small defender (or insurgent)
diffused in the population. The resulting model is an adaptation of the Lanch-
ester Linear Law (see e.g., Washburn and Kress (2009) p. 83) and Deitchman’s













Fig. 1: Schematic dynamics of the model. The four variables in the model ap-
pear as boxes, where each box represents a possible combination of pop-
ulation behavior and controlling force. Solid lines indicate change in
control of population while dashed lines indicate the force causing it.
Observe that the population does not change allegiances even under oc-
cupation.
The attrition rate constants depend on the tactics, technology, and equip-
ment of the parties. Thus if one of the sides represents the government, which
will have an initial advantage in many of these categories, these attrition rates
will capture this advantage. The attrition rates, however, also depend upon the
behavior of the population. Thus, let fS and fC denote the rates of liberation of
friendly regions by Blue and Red forces, respectively. Similarly, let hC and hS
denote the rates of subjugation of hostile regions by Blue and Red, respectively.
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The resulting dynamics is given in Eqs. 1.
SB′ = +fSSB · SR− hSCR · SB
SR′ = −fSSB · SR+ hSCR · SB (1)
CR′ = +fCCR · CB − hCSB · CR
CB′ = −fCCR · CB + hCSB · CR
Since it is easier to fight in friendly territory, we make the following dominance
assumption:
fS > hC and fC > hS . (2)
End-State of the Revolt
From solving Eqs. 1 we obtain that the conflict can result in one of three out-
comes, corresponding to the stable equilibrium points of the equations:
1. Blue victory: SB + CB = 1,
2. Red victory: CR+ SR = 1,
3. Stalemate: Both sides control a fraction of the total population.
It can be shown that the evolution of the conflict does not involve cycles
where populated regions change sides endlessly; rather, the conflict dissipates
and reaches a stable state. Proofs of this and all other results are given in the
Appendix at the end of this article.
The stable outcomes are not dependent on all four attrition rates but rather






. We call these the “liberation-subjugation
effectiveness
ratio” (LSER) of supporters and contrarians, respectively. These ratios ac-
count for differences in tactics, technology, and information between Blue and
Red, and also reflect the ability and commitment of the local population to
support its preferred force. The outcomes are:
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Fig. 2: Outcomes of the conflict when S = 40% as a function of rS and rC . (A)
The possible outcomes are: stalemate (gray), Red victory (red) and Blue
victory (blue). The white area is excluded by the dominance assumption
(Ineqs. 2). Outright victory is possible only when one party has a low
LSER. Increasing rS and rC makes both parties much more entrenched
in their areas, leading to a stalemate regardless of the value of S. (B)
The amount of territory controlled by Blue. Observe that a very sharp
change in the outcome is predicted as rC approaches
2
3
, from a balanced
stalemate to a Blue victory.
These results4 are summarized in Figure 2A. It follows from Ineqs. 3–4 that
the fate of the armed revolt is completely determined by the LSERs and the
population split between supporters S and contrarians C = 1 − S; it does not
depend on the initial sizes of the Blue and Red forces. Moreover, the minimum
popular support needed to guarantee Blue’s win only depends on the LSER in
the contrarians’ territory. Specifically, Blue wins if and only if rC(1 − S) < S,
that is, if the fraction of its supporters is larger than the fraction of contrarians
times the LSER in contrarians’ territory. An equivalent statement applies for
Red victory, which happens if and only if rS(1 − C) < C. The operational
implication of these two conditions is that strengthening one’s advantage in
friendly territories (e.g., Blue increasing rS) may be sufficient to avoid defeat
but not to secure a win; if one is not effectively fighting in hostile territory (e.g.,
Blue cannot sufficiently decrease rC) then one cannot win; the best it can hope
4 Technically, we assume that at the start of the dynamics both forces have some presence
in a friendly territory, i.e. SB0 > 0 and CR0 > 0. Otherwise, one of the forces is never
challenged and wins trivially. Also, the model has a fourth equilibrium that corresponds to
the case where the territory is divided between Blue and Red who control only hostile territory
(SR + CB = 1). Obviously, such a situation is very unlikely and indeed this equilibrium is
unstable, as shown in the Appendix.
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for is a stalemate. At the stalemate equilibrium, denoted XYb
CBb =
S(1 + rS)− 1
rSrC − 1
, SRb =
rC − S(1 + rC)
rSrC − 1
, (5)
SBb = rCCBb, CRb = rSSRb.
Notice that the denominators are always positive because of the dominance
assumption (see Ineqs. 2). Eqs. 5 indicate that as S increases an increasing part
of the population is controlled by Blue. When rC increases, a larger fraction of
the contrarians is able to remain free (i.e. ruled by Red).
We plot the fraction of the population controlled by Blue during a stalemate
(i.e., CB + SB) in Figure 2B. (We only present the plot for S = 0.4, but other
values of S are qualitatively similar.) Near the Blue victory condition defined
by Ineq. 3 the fraction of the population controlled by Blue is near one, but
quickly decreases as rC increases. Similarly, the fraction of population controlled
by Blue rapidly increases as rS moves away from the Red victory condition.
However, after the significant initial change in the fraction of Blue’s regions as
rS or rC increases, the surface flattens out. As both rS and rC continue to
increase, the fraction of Blue’s regions approaches S. Therefore, when rS and
rC are reasonably bounded away from their thresholds, an entrenched stalemate
occurs where Red and Blue control primarily their friendly territories.
Extensions of the Basic model
We consider now two extensions of the basic model: the case of foreign inter-
vention and the case of shifting popular support.
Foreign Military Intervention
Most large revolts in modern times involved foreign military interventions by
regional or global powers (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010; Small and Singer, 1982).
Such interventions can be manifested in two ways: direct and indirect. Direct
intervention (e.g., air-strike support to ground units, such as the intervention
of NATO forces in Libya in 2011) allows the supported side to exercise more
firepower against its opponent. Indirect intervention provides the supported
side with force multipliers such as intelligence, training, logistical support and
advanced weapons, but no additional firepower per se. In both cases we assume
that just one side, say Blue, receives the foreign support. We leave for future
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studies to consider the case of foreign support to both sides.
Direct intervention. For simplicity, suppose that the foreign constituent is
tactically superior and it experiences negligible attrition (e.g., air support for
Blue that is subject to ineffective air defense of Red). Therefore, the effectiveness
of the foreign constituent remains fixed throughout the armed revolt. However,
similarly to the direct engagements discussed above, its ability to target Red
diminishes as the size of Red’s forces decreases. In that case, Red targets are
harder to find and engage. Let λS , λC > 0 denote the combat power of the
foreign constituent when operating in supporters’ (S) regions and contrarians’
(C) regions, respectively. The separation into two combat power parameters
allow for the possibility that the foreign constituent only contributes to certain
kinds of operations (e.g. only to liberating supporters), and/or is affected by
the behavior of the population, just like Blue. In this case Eqs. 1 become
SB′ = +fSSB · SR− hSCR · SB + λSSR
SR′ = −fSSB · SR+ hSCR · SB − λSSR (6)
CR′ = +fCCR · CB − hCSB · CR − λCCR
CB′ = −fCCR · CB + hCSB · CR + λCCR
Since the effectiveness of the foreign constituent remains unaffected, it is clear
that Red cannot win. The only two outcomes are Blue’s victory and a stalemate.
Blue wins if and only if λC > fC(1 − S) − hCS. Otherwise, the armed revolt
ends in a stalemate. Like in the basic model, the conflict dissipates and reaches
a stable state, and no cycles are possible.
An interesting observation is that the value of λS – the combat power of the
foreign constituent in friendly regions – plays no role in helping Blue achieve
victory; it only ensures that Blue will not lose as long as λS > 0. The threshold
of λC that determines Blue’s victory is the difference between two terms, each
a combination of combat effectiveness and popular support: fC(1− S) is Red’s
effectiveness fighting on friendly territory times its popular support, and hCS
is Blue’s effectiveness fighting on hostile territory times its popular support.
Clearly, this threshold decreases as the support to Blue increases. In particular,
a sufficient condition for Blue victory is λC > fC , which only depends upon
the fighting effectiveness of Red. Consequently, even if Blue has limited tactical
capabilities or a small amount of popular support, it can still prevail with enough
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assistance from a foreign constituent.
We do not consider the situation where the foreign constituent experiences
attrition. The standard example would be foreign ground troops participating
directly in combat, such as the US involvement in Vietnam. Analyzing this sce-
nario would involve defining an additional state variable for the strength of the
intervening force and modeling its dynamics (e.g., attrition and reinforcements).
Such an expanded model is beyond the scope of this paper.
Indirect intervention. Indirect intervention (force multiplier) increases the
ability of Blue to defend its territory and to attack Red forces. Specifically,
the liberation rate fS and the subjugation rate hC are multiplied by factors
µS , µC > 1, respectively, where the structure of Eqs. 1 remains unchanged. The
LSER values rS and rC change to µSrS and
rC
µC
, respectively. Using the condi-
tions in Ineq. 4 we obtain that for Blue to avoid defeat it is sufficient that the





We see that if the Blue forces have low LSER, i.e. cannot hold their own
territory, they may be defeated despite assistance from their foreign backers. In






Because rSrC > 1, the threshold of µC is always larger than the threshold of
µS – it is more costly to secure a victory than to avoid a loss. Obviously, the
indirect intervention is needed to secure a victory only if S is small enough,
specifically, if S < rC
1+rC
. Note that “small enough” may actually be quite large
when Red is very effective on its own turf compared with Blue (rC is large).
Opportunistic Population
While in some conflicts the behavior of the people is highly polarized and un-
changing, in others the population might be quite opportunistic and favor the
side that appears more likely to win. It follows that the fraction of the sup-
porters, and hence contrarians, changes according to the state of the conflict.
We capture this situation by treating the fraction of supporters S as a dynamic
variable, and adding to Eqs. 1 an equation for S′. The value of S′ increases
with the fraction of population Blue controls (SB+CB) and decreases with the
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fraction controlled by Red (CR+ SR). Because C = 1− S, SR = S − SB, and
CB = 1− S − CR, we obtain from Eqs. 1 the three equations:
SB′ = +fSSB(S − SB)− hSCR · SB
CR′ = +fCCR(1− S − CR)− hCSB · CR (7)
S′ = +α(SB + 1− S − CR)(1 − S)− α(CR + S − SB)S,
where α is a parameter that determines the rate at which individuals switch
allegiances, which is assumed to be the same for both the supporters and con-
trarians. With opportunistic population there are only two potential outcomes:
1. Blue victory where the entire population supports Blue, who controls all
regions (SB = 1), and
2. Red victory where the entire population supports Red, who controls all
regions (CR = 1).
These two equilibria are stable for all parameter values. There are also two
stalemate equilibria: a balanced stalemate where SB,CR > 0, and a disarmed
stalemate where SB = CR = 0. Neither of the two stalemate equilibria are
stable. The disarmed stalemate is neither realistic nor relevant. The balanced
stalemate, given below, is more interesting because it lies on a boundary that
separates the basins of attraction for the two victory situations:
SB∗ =
rC








2 + rS + rC
. (10)
Thus, the stalemate equilibrium gives a rough metric for the potential outcome
of the conflict. For example, the closer the stalemate equilibrium is to the Blue
victory point, the more likely Red will win the conflict. This occurs because most
of the 3-dimensional (rS , rC , S) parameter space lies in the basin of attraction
corresponding to Red victory.
Comments on Recent Revolts
In this section we discuss several nascent and ongoing (in 2011) revolts in light of
the SBCR model above and its extensions. We have also attempted to system-
October 12, 2011 12
atically validate this model empirically, but while data on armed conflicts exist
(e.g., UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Themner and Wallensteen, 2011)
and Correlates of War Data (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010)), none of the data sets
includes the information necessary for us to make quantitative estimates of the
parameters, particularly the parameters rS , and rC . Thus, while we could not
compute precise estimates of the model parameters, we show that many of the
ongoing conflicts are at a state consistent with our model. The model suggests
how the outcomes might be effected by decisions including those currently on
the policy table.
Libya
The available information regarding the revolt in Libya is based mainly on
fragmented, and largely anectodal, news reports. It suggests that the conflict
has progressed through three stages: During the first stage, mid February to
mid March 2011, the rebels established local governments but then experienced
setbacks and were collapsing in the face of a regime offensive toward their base in
Benghazi (MacAskill et al., 2011). In the second stage, mid March to late April,
NATO established a no-fly zone and blocked further incursions by Qaddafi’s
forces. A stalemate developed with the rebels repelling Qaddafi’s forces and
vice versa. Finally in the third stage, from early May to September, NATO
gradually intensified its air strikes and aid to the rebels leading to rapid rebel
progress, and eventually to the fall of Tripoli.
This progression is consistent with our model, as follows. In the first stage,
Qaddafi’s forces (labeled Red) were much better trained, equipped and orga-
nized than the rebels (labeled Blue). The regime’s forces could successfully
beat the rebels even in rebel-supporting regions, suggesting that fS < hS and
fC > hC , which implies that rS < 1 and rC > 1. From Ineq. 4 and that S ≈ 40%
we learn that Qaddafi should have achieved a clear victory, crushing the revolt.
(Here we estimated S from the fact that three of the seven largest districts
in Libya – Benghazi, Misrata and Az-Zawiya – established rebel governance,
and these amount to approximately 40% of Libya’s population.) In the second
stage the foreign intervention was defensive in nature (λS > 0 and λC = 0) and
attrition to NATO forces was negligible. The model indicates that under such
conditions the rebels could no longer be defeated. The rebels were also provided
training and gear to help them repel Qaddafi’s attempts at recapturing rebelling
population, i.e. increasing the rebels’ rS but not changing rC . Thus the rebels
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remained inferior to the regime’ forces when fighting in territory controlled by
Qaddafi or supporting him. Consistent with our model, we saw a stalemate be-






in the third stage, the foreign intervention gradually began to aid the rebel of-
fensive: NATO provided weapons (decreasing rC) as well as tactical air support
(increasing λC) (Fahim and Mazzetti, 2011). The near-complete victory by the
rebels (as of September 2011) is exactly what one expects from the model when
rC is brought sufficiently low.
Afghanistan
One can view the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan (2001-) as a struggle of
government and coalition forces (Blue) against Salafists (Red) led by the Tal-
iban. Many observers of the conflict point to the critical need of both parties
to win the support of the population, so the conflict is a good application of
our model. According to the 2007 report by the International Council on Se-
curity and Development, the Taliban have permanent presence in 54% of the
country (International Council on Security and Development, 2007). Suppose,
pessimistically, that the Taliban movement has the support of all the people in
the regions where it is present. Assuming fixed behavior of the population (no
opportunistic shifts) the situation in Afghanistan will continue in its current
stalemate form unless rS < 1.17 (giving Red a victory) or rC < 0.85 (giving
Blue a victory). Thus, the model suggests that the government can avoid a
Taliban takeover of the country by nurturing the support of the population it
currently controls, and it is not necessary to push back the Taliban from their
areas.
Syria
The situation in Syria is currently (September 2011) in a state of civil unrest
rather than a full-scale armed revolt: The Syrian army and paramilitaries face
massive but largly unarmed demonstrations. If the situation does escalate into
an armed revolt, what might be its outcome? The opposition (Red) would be at
a disadvantage against the government forces (Blue), which are led by special
units of the Syrian army that possess superior tactics and weapons. Therefore,
rS is likely large and rC is likely small. Furthermore, the international commu-
nity appears less likely to become involved as compared to Libya. However, if
the opposition unites under effective leadership and initiates a strong offensive
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push (perhaps drawing in foreign intervention), then we anticipate that the As-
sad regime would face a strong challenge because of its narrow base of support
in the Alawite sect (assuming he does not enlarge his base.)




suming S ≈ 10% (the entire Alawite community (Central Intelligence Agency,
2009)), the government must have rS ≥ 9 in order to avoid defeat. If we assume
other minority groups (e.g., Christians and Druze) also generally support the
government (New York Times, 2011), then S ≈ 25% (Central Intelligence Agency,
2009) and to avoid defeat the the government would need just rS ≥ 3. Thus, for
the government to avoid defeat in an armed revolt, it would need to maintain
strong loyalty of its backers and/or tactical superiority. This seems unlikely:
there appears to be strong discontent even within the Alawite community and
the rebels could come to acquire military hardware from their foreign backers –
hardware such as armor-piercing munitions and air cover to neutralize govern-
ment forces. Furthermore, the currently observed (September 2011) stalemate
is partly a result of foreign intervention by Iranian and Hezbollah combatants
(Tisdall, 2011). This intervention is covert and therefore fragile. In sum, while
the current situation does not appear promising for the opposition, changes in
the domestic political climate, or the international community’s stance on in-
tervention could quickly turn the tide and lead to the defeat of Syria’s Assad
regime.
Summary and Conclusions
We present a new Lanchester-type model that represents the dynamics of lib-
erating and subjugating populated regions in the setting of an armed revolt.
We identify winning and stalemate conditions and obtain some general insights
regarding the revolt’s end state. Many revolts do not have a decisive outcome,
with both sides entrenched in a prolonged stalemate. Our model explicitly iden-
tifies this realistic outcome, which is not captured in classical Lanchester theory.
Our model also illustrates that it is not sufficient to ably control friendly regions;
for victory it is crucial to be able to effectively fight in hostile regions.
We also study the effect of foreign intervention (e.g., NATO intervention in
Libya) on the outcome of a revolt. We find that while direct intervention to
support one side will prevent defeat of that side and can facilitate a win even if
that side has very little popular support, indirect intervention cannot guarantee
this particularly when its LSER is low. The level of foreign intervention (either
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direct or indirect) required to defeat an opponent depends on the popular sup-
port (S) and the attrition coefficients (fC and hC) in the contrarians’ territory;
it does not depend on the capabilities of the forces in supporters’ regions.
Finally if the population can shift its support, then a stalemate is not pos-
sible. A bandwagon-type effect will occur where the population increases its
support to the apparent winner, which strengthens it and leads to more sup-
port, which further strengthens it and so on until the side achieves victory.
Unlike the case of fixed population behavior, the results of this scenario are
sensitive to the initial conditions.
The model we present agrees in its predictions with the views of many ana-
lysts of the ongoing conflicts. Therefore, our contribution to the current policy
debate is to make explicit the latent assumptions of previous studies. For the
future, the model (and its variants) could help to anticipate the outcomes of
different kinds of revolts.
Appendix A: Victory Conditions
In general, dynamical systems may exhibit stable oscillations. We now show
that the system of equations in Eqs. 1 does not have those oscillations (no
limit cycles). This means that the state variables will always reach one of the
equilibrium points (by the Poincare´-Bendixon Theorem (Strogatz, 2000) and
noting that the state space is bounded).
Theorem 1 (Dulac’s Criterion (Strogatz, 2000)). Let x˙ = f(x) be a smooth
system on a simply-connected set S ⊂ R2. Let w : S → R be smooth on S.
Suppose on S the expression ∇ · (f(x)w(x)) does not change sign. Then the
system has no limit cycle on S.
Proposition 1. The system of Eqs. 1 does not have limit cycles.
Proof. We first write the model as a system of two independent equations by
removing the mixed variables:
SB′ = +fSSB(S − SB)− hSCR · SB (11)




SB(S − SB)CR(C − CR)
.
October 12, 2011 16
Both the system and w are smooth on the set (0, S) × (0, C) (points on the
boundary of this space move to one of the fixed points and do not oscillate.)
∇ · (fw) = ∇ ·
(
fS(S − SB)− hSCR
(S − SB)CR(C − CR)
,
fC(C − CR)− hCSB




(S − SB)2(C − CR)
+
−hC
(S − SB)(C − CR)2
< 0.
We next show that the victory conditions in Ineqs. 3, 4 correspond to the
stability conditions for the equilibria points. Throughout, we assume that 0 <
S < 1, i.e. S is not on its boundary.
Theorem 2. The following four statements hold for the system of differential
equations defined by Eqs. 1:
• The equilibrium CR = SB = 0 and SR = 1− CB = S is never stable.
• The Blue victory equilibrium (CR = SR = 0 and SB = 1 − CB = S) is




• The Red victory equilibrium (SB = CB = 0 and CR = 1− SB = 1 − S)












Proof. The model is fully specified based on two variables: SB and CR, Eqs. 11-
12. We first compute the Jacobian of the right hand size of differential equation
J(SB,CR) =
(
fS(S − 2SB)− hSCR −hSSB
−hCCR fC(1 − S − 2CR)− hCSB
)
A solution (SB∗, CR∗) to the differential equation is stable if the two eigenvalues
of J(SB∗, CR∗) have negative real parts (Strogatz, 2000). By inspection the
equilibrium with SB = CR = 0 is not stable for any parameter values.
Blue Victory
The characteristic polynomial in this case is
(−fSS − λ)(fC(1− S)− hCS − λ) = 0.
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The first eigenvalue, −fSS, is always negative and the second eigenvalue, fC(1−





The characteristic polynomial in this case is
(−fC(1 − S)− λ)(fSS − hS(1− S)− λ) = 0.
The first eigenvalue, −fC(1− S), is always negative and the second eigenvalue,
fSS − hS(1 − S), is negative if rS <
1−S
S
. By the dominance assumption (i.e.,





. Therefore it is not possible for both
the Blue victory and Red victory to be stable equilibria for the same values of
rS and rC . This also implies that if rS <
1−S
S




a Red victory cannot occur.
Stalemate
At the stalemate equilibrium, the variables have the values SBb, SRb, CRb, and
CBb. We next present a lemma, and then prove that the stalemate equilibrium is
stable if and only if 1
1+rS
< S < rC
1+rC







Lemma 1. The product SBbCRb is positive if and only if
1
1+rS
< S < rC
1+rC
.
Proof. By Eqs. 5, SBb is positive if
1
1+rS
< S, and CRb is positive if S <
rC
1+rC




, and therefore it
is impossible for SBb and CRb to both be negative.
Lemma 1 and Eqs. 5 imply that if 1
1+rS
< S < rC
1+rC
, then SBb, SRb, CRb,
and CBb are all positive (and by conservation of total population, less than 1).






We derive the upper left hand element of this Jacobian below
J11(SBb, CRb) = fS(S − 2SBb)− hSCRb




2SrC(1 + rS)− 2rC
rSrC − 1
−
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The lower right hand element of J(SBb, CRb) can be derived in a similar fash-
ion and we omit the details. The eigenvalues of J(SBb, CRb) will both have a
negative real component if the trace of J(SBb, CRb) is negative and the determi-
nant is positive The determinant of J(SBb, CRb) is SBbCRbhChS(rSrC − 1). If
1
1+rS
< S < rC
1+rC
, then by Lemma 1 the trace is negative and the determinant







then by Lemma 1 the determinant of J(SBb, CRb) is negative and thus one of
the eigenvalues has a positive real component and the stalemate equilibrium is
not stable.
Appendix B: Direct Foreign Intervention














SR+ hSCR · SB (13)




















. The stalemate equilibrium
of these equations is denoted with a subscript fi (“foreign intervention”) and






























CRfi = 1− S − CBfi (17)
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(SBb is the value at stalemate of the variable SB in the basic model, Eqs. 5.)
To derive these expressions we first write the analog of Eqs. 11–12:
SB′ = +fS(SB +AS)(S − SB)− hSCR · SB (18)
CR′ = +fCCR(1− S − CR)− hC(SB +AC)CR (19)
Solving Eqs. 18–19 for the stalemate equilibrium root results in two equations
fS(SB +AS)(S − SB) = hSCR · SB (20)
fC(1− S − CR) = hC(SB +AC) (21)
Solving Eq. 20 for CR and substituting into Eq. 21 produces a quadratic in SB.
Solving for the positive root of that quadratic yields the expression for SBfi in
Eq. 14. Substituting SBfi into Eq. 21 gives CBfi in Eq. 16. Similarly to the
basic model, it is possible to exclude cycles, as follows.
Proposition 2. The set of Eqs. 6 does not have limit cycles.




(SB +AS)CR(1 − S − CR)
.
Both the system and w are smooth on the set (0, S)× (0, 1− S).
wSB′ =
fS(SB +AS)(S − SB)− hSCR · SB
(SB +AS)CR(1− S − CR)
=
fS(S − SB)
CR(1− S − CR)
−
hS








fCCR(1 − S − CR)− hC(SB +AC)CR






(SB + AS)(1− S − CR)
.
Note that 1−S−CR = C−CR > 0 in the strictly positive quadrant. Therefore,
∇ · (fw) =
−fS
CR(1− S − CR)
−
hS












(SB +AS)(1 − S − CR)2
< 0.
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Before proceeding to examine the stability properties of the victory equilib-
rium and the stalemate equilibrium, we note there are two other equilibrium
points to the system defined by Eqs. 6: CR = 0, SB = −λS
fS
and an equilibrium
similar to Eqs. 14–17, but with SBfi the negative root of the quadratic that
produced Eq. 14. Because both of these equilibria consist of negative values,
which cannot be realized, we do not analyze them further. We next show that
the victory condition defined in corresponds to the stability conditions for the
equilibria points.
Theorem 3. For the system of differential equations defined by Eqs. 13, the
Blue victory equilibrium (CR = SR = 0) is stable if and only if rC−AC
1+rC
< S.
Proof. We first compute the Jacobian of the right hand size of differential equa-
tion defined in Eqs. 18–19
Jfi(SB,CR) =
(
fS(S − 2SB −AS)− hSCR −hSSB
−hCCR fC(1− S − 2CR)− hC(SB +AC)
)
For the Blue victory equilibrium (SB = S,CR = 0), the characteristic polyno-
mial is
(−fS(S +AS)− λ)(fC(1 − S)− hC(S +AC)− λ) = 0.
The first eigenvalue, −fS(S+AS), is always negative and the second eigenvalue,
fC(1− S)− hC(S +AC), is negative if
rC−AC
1+rC
< S. Writing out this condition
in terms of the direct foreign intervention parameter λC = AChC produces the
condition: λC > fC(1− S) + hCS.
Theorem 3 provides a necessary condition for Blue victory. We have not
been able to prove the stability characteristics for the stalemate equilibrium
analytically, which would provide the sufficient conditions for Blue victory. This
is given in Conjecture 1 and extensive numerical experimentation makes us
confident that this conjecture does hold.
Conjecture 1.




October 12, 2011 21
Appendix C: Opportunistic Population
We next show that victory is the only possible outcome of the opportunistic
population model.
Theorem 4. The following four statements hold for the system of differential
equations defined by Eqs. 7:
• The equilibrium CR = SB = 0 and S = 1
2
is never stable.
• The Blue victory equilibrium (CR = 0 and SB = S = 1 ) is always stable.
• The Red victory equilibrium (SB = S = 0 and CR = 1) is always stable.
• The stalemate equilibrium defined in Eqs. 8–10 is never stable.




fS(S − 2SB)− hSCR −hSSB fSSB




A solution (SB∗, CR∗, S∗) to the differential equation is stable if the three
eigenvalues of Jop(SB
∗, CR∗, S∗) have negative real parts. By inspection the
equilibrium with (SB∗, CR∗, S∗) = (0, 0, 1
2
) is not stable for any parameter val-
ues.
Blue Victory
For the equilibrium (SB∗, CR∗, S∗) = (1, 0, 1) the characteristic polynomial is
(−hC − λ)(λ
2 + λ(2α+ fS) + αfS) = 0.
The first eigenvalue, −hC , is always negative and the second and third eigen-
values are always negative by appealing to the quadratic formula for the second
term.
Red Victory
For the equilibrium (SB∗, CR∗, S∗) = (0, 1, 0) the characteristic polynomial is
(−hS − λ)(λ
2 + λ(2α+ fC) + αfC) = 0.
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The first eigenvalue, −hS , is always negative and the second and third eigen-
values are always negative by appealing to the quadratic formula for the second
term.
Stalemate
Substituting the equilibrium points Eqs. 8–10 into the Jacobian yields
Jop(SB





















To calculate the eigenvalues, we need to find the roots of the characteristic
polynomial g(λ) = det (Jop(SB
∗, CR∗, S∗)− λI). Because limλ→∞ g(λ) = −∞,
if g(0) = det (Jop(SB
∗, CR∗, S∗)) > 0, then by the Intermediate Value Theorem
there must be a positive eigenvalue and the stalemate equilibrium must be
unstable. We will now show that this is the case for all possible parameter







α (−2fSrCfCrS + hSrCfCrS + fSrChCrS + fSrCfCrS + fSrCfCrS + 2hSrChCrS)
(2 + rS + rC)2
=
αrSrC (hSfC + fShC + 2hShC)
(2 + rS + rC)2
> 0.
Therefore there will always be a positive eigenvalue associated with the stale-
mate equilibrium defined by Eqs. 8–10, and so it cannot be stable.
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